The public fills all four corners, not one diagonal

Density of the recent American public (ANES, pooled 2012–2024) by economic conservatism (horizontal) and cultural conservatism (vertical), each standardised. Darker cells hold more people. The faint cross marks the population midpoint of each axis; quadrant labels give each type’s share.

economically left →  economically right cultural conservatism rises upward fewer →  more people

Takeaway: the densest cells form a broad blob across the centre, not a thin diagonal. Two of the four quadrants — the populist (econ-left, culturally-right) and the libertarian (econ-right, culturally-left) — together hold about a third of the public.

Quadrants split at the weighted median of each index within the recent pool, so the cuts are population-balanced rather than set at zero. Cell shading is the weighted share of respondents in each two-dimensional bin. Source: ANES Cumulative File, 2012–2024, weighted; n = 19,652 in the pooled recent sample.

Two dimensions, slowly fusing — and still far from one

Weighted correlation between the economic-conservatism index and the cultural-conservatism index, by ANES year, 1984–2024. A correlation of 1.0 would mean a single ideology; the series stays well below it.

econ–cultural correlation (r) r = 1 would be one ideology

Takeaway: the two dimensions have drawn closer over forty years — from almost unrelated to moderately correlated — but the line never approaches 1.0. They are fusing, not fused.

Pearson correlation of the two oriented z-scored indices, weighted, by year. Early pool (1984–1992) r = 0.11; late pool (2008–2024) r = 0.45. Years with effective N < 200 suppressed. Source: ANES Cumulative File, weighted.

Both dimensions drive what Americans call themselves — cultural a hair more

Weighted coefficients from a regression of seven-point self-placed ideology on the economic and cultural conservatism indices (each standardised), early era (1984–1996) versus late era (1998–2024).

economic conservatism → self-ID cultural conservatism → self-ID

Takeaway: both coefficients grow from era to era — ideology is tightening around both axes — and the cultural bar edges the economic in both periods. This is co-strengthening, not a cultural takeover: the cultural share of the combined pull barely moves.

Weighted least-squares coefficients; the outcome is lib_con_7pt (1 = liberal … 7 = conservative). Cultural share of the combined absolute pull is 52.1 percent early and 51.8 percent late — essentially flat. Source: ANES Cumulative File, weighted; early n = 7,815, late n = 20,147.