The devout and the secular pulled apart
Cultural-conservatism index (z-scored on the pooled GSS sample; higher = more culturally conservative) by church-attendance level, across five eras, 1972–2024.
Takeaway: the frequent attenders drift gently down off their conservative perch, but the seldom-attenders fall away far faster — the gap widens because the secular keep getting more liberal.
A residual became a quarter of the country
Share reporting no religious affiliation by birth cohort (bars), with the era trend overlaid (line). Each younger cohort secularizes further; the nones now reach 37 percent of the youngest.
Takeaway: every younger cohort is more secular than the last, and the period trend climbs in step — the unaffiliated rose from one-in-thirteen to better than one-in-four.
The god gap bites culture, not economics
Weighted correlation of two religiosity measures with cultural and with economic conservatism. Religiosity tracks the culture-war axis far more than the spending axis.
Takeaway: on culture the bars stand tall for both the religiosity index and attendance alone; on economics they barely clear the floor — the god gap is a culture-war phenomenon.